

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	SECRET	PROPOSED	ACCOMPLISHED
TO	Chief of Station, Germany	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief of Base, Munich; Chief of Base, Frankfurt; Chief of Station, []		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief, EE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	[] /LCIMPROVE		ABSTRACT
	Theo SAEVECKE		MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: See Below

REF: A. EGOA-21295, 11 February 1964 (Not to [])
B. DIR -01561, February 1964

1. The suggestion in the Attachment to EGOW-3997 was made primarily to insure addressees would not fail to give careful consideration to unilateral possibilities before passing the information to the Germans. The following additional information should be considered before any action is taken.

2. For the record we would like to call to your attention another strange incident in Subject's history which, although it cannot be accurately evaluated as yet, certainly gives rise to interesting speculation. We refer to OIRA-33580, 2 April 1963 (to Headquarters and COS/G only). On 22 February 1963 [] received from [] a report from a long time source who in turn had received the information from a "foreign and reliable" sub-source. In a subsequent report the source was identified as Subject. The report stated that "the Pentagon" is dissatisfied with the results obtained by the AIS in Italy in its present form (American Embassy in collaboration with SIFAR and the Ministry), and is proposing the establishment

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

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CROSS REFERENCE TO		DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
		10 MARCH 64	23 MAR 1964
CLASSIFICATION		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
SECRET		EGOW-4063	
ORIGINATING		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
OFFICE		EXT.	
EE/G/CE		5751	
COORDINATING			
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
WE/4	16 Mar 64	[]	
C/SR/CI	17 Mar 64	[]	
DC/CI	17 Mar 64	[]	
C/EE/G/CE	11/3/64	[]	
C/EE/G		[]	
RELEASING			
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE		
C/EE	19 Mar 64	[]	

53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

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DISPATCH

of its own service in Italy - an autonomous one, not connected with any of the foregoing. The task of organizing this network has been entrusted to a high-ranking American official who knows Italy well and used to serve there in a similar capacity. (Comment: This American subsequently was identified as Joseph LUONGO, a military intelligence officer with dubious operational contacts who was PNGd from Italy in May 1961 after almost fifteen years on the Italian scene as an Army representative.) Another SAEVECKE report was received on 11 March 1963 through the same channel. This report contained the following:

A. The Pentagon's desire to set up an independent net to control Italian internal events, was based on the fact the Pentagon did not share the same point of view as the information agencies of the State Department with regard to the Italian internal situation.

B. The American Colonel had requested that SAEVECKE identify to him German ex-agents still residing in Italy.

C. The American Colonel would come to Italy between 19-31 March to confer with political personalities close to Mario SCELBA (former Prime Minister and Minister of Interior), as well as some high officials of the Italian police with whom he had been in contact in the past.

D. According to SAEVECKE, the American Colonel does not look favorably on the Commanding General of the "Carabinieri," or the National Chief of Police, claiming these individuals are tied in to the "Center-Left" government, favored by the State Department, but not by the Pentagon.

3. [] discussed the case with the SETAF G-2 on 27 March 1963, and they disclaimed any knowledge. According to SETAF, Joseph LUONGO was assigned to the 513th ICG in Germany at the time (He apparently still is). KUBARK [] believed SETAF suspected either the 513th ICG or DIA was making an end-run on SETAF. No action was taken by KUBARK to resolve the issue in Germany. Even assuming the Army in Germany was behind this maneuver, it is difficult to explain either LUONGO's or SAEVECKE's actions. Their involvement in internal Italian affairs, to the possible detriment of American/Italian relations and of American intelligence interests, would have benefited no one (except possibly the Soviets).

4. It is suggested that COS/G raise the question of LUONGO's activities, past and present, with emphasis on the SAEVECKE aspect with USAREUR. Should COS/G not desire to do this, Headquarters would be willing to explore the matter with ACSI. Please advise.

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